My Beautiful Orchid

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and denotes a fence barring access to something of great value. In Chinese tradition the orchid is symbolic of refinement—of that which is rare and precious reserved only for those worthy of it.

On the other hand Du is a common Chinese surname with little to distinguish it. Chinese orphanages frequently assign surnames like this to their wards precisely because they lend themselves to being handed out in quantity to anonymous children that no family will claim—like “Jane Doe”. The little girl who awaited us on the other side of the world was a unique and priceless treasure chosen by the grace of God just for us…. And yet, she was just another foundling among countless others, nearly all girls, abandoned to Social Welfare Institutes—one more brick in China’s other great wall.

Infant Abandonment

China’s infant abandonment problem is as complex as it is disturbing. Very little data about it exists and what does is difficult to confirm. Understandably, those who are abandoning infants rarely acknowledge having done so and government bureaucracies are equally reluctant to share information about a national problem that casts them in a bad light. We do know that the problem is neither new, nor unique to China. The social practice of infanticide (which goes hand in hand with abandonment) goes back at least as far as the Han Dynasty. During the 17th century it was widespread enough that Hubei and Hunan Provinces criminalized it, but it was no more common there than it was in Europe during the same period. By the mid 18th century Hunan Province had 68 county level orphanages and a number of “foundling hospitals” run by foreign missionaries. Other provinces had similar histories. Since then the practice has varied by region and period, typically rising during periods of famine or economic hardship and declining during stable ones. It appears to have been particularly common in the southern provinces and throughout the Yangtze River watershed (which is heavily rural and agricultural). In the 20th century orphanage intakes reached record highs in the 50’s when China underwent a rapid shift to collectivization, and again during the famine following Mao’s “Great Leap Forward”. By the mid 70’s political and economic stability had been restored and levels declined.

While this orphan population is not unusual globally, with a foundling population that is over 90 percent female, its gender bias is (the only other Eurasian nation that shows a similar pattern is India). For many centuries Chinese families have been built around patriarchal traditions that placed special value on sons. Though this preference is hardly new, in recent years it has grown to a near obsession, particularly in rural poor regions where China’s aggressive population control efforts have left families with few reproductive options. For those desperate enough, this has created a strong incentive for abandoning infant daughters. During the 90’s various estimates placed China’s orphan population at 100,000 to 160,000, including foundlings. These figures are almost certainly low. In normal populations biologically determined sex ratios run around 105 boys for every 100 girls, which is very close to what is observed in most developed countries. Census data shows that in 1953 and 1964 China’s gender ratio was also in this range. But in the early 80’s after Deng Xiaoping introduced the infamous “One-Child” policy it began to climb. By 1981 it had risen to 108.5 and by 1990 to 114.7. When compared to 1990 census figures this amounts to 1 million fewer female births per year than normal demographic trends say there must have been, and according to some estimates, 13 million total—China’s “missing girls”. Where are they? According to some estimates state run child welfare and social welfare institutes account for only 20 percent of this figure. If this is true what has become of the other 80 percent?

A considerable number are accounted for by sex-selective abortion. In 1994 Beijing criminalized the practice under the Marriage Law and the Women's Protection Law, but regulation and enforcement of these laws is difficult at best. Ultrasound technology is readily available throughout China, even in the poorest of state run hospitals. A Chinese built ultrasound machine technologically advanced enough to discriminate fetal sex can be purchased for around $1000 American. Doctors can quickly replace an investment in one by offering screenings for as little as 200 to 300 yuan (roughly $50 American give or take) with little risk of being caught. Due to the illegality of the procedure for pregnant couples as well as doctors, malpractice and inaccurate results are seldom reported, offering doctors another layer of safety. Given the demand for sons in rural areas, the black-market potential is enormous. At least one 1999 report by the International Planned Parenthood Federation found that 500,000 to 750,000 girls are selectively aborted annually. If so, then this practice alone may account for nearly 74 percent of China’s missing girls.

What of the remaining 25 to 50 percent? No one truly knows how many of them have been abandoned. Estimates typically run in the tens of thousands but are highly uncertain. Nor is it known how many perish, either from direct infanticide or neglect. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that most do not, but are instead absorbed by orphanages and informal adoptions. During the 80’s 10,000 to 15,000 domestic adoptions per year were officially registered, but survey data suggests that a far greater number of informal adoptions took place. Over the last few decades China has generally allowed domestic adoption only under stringent conditions that few couples could meet. To apply they must be childless and over the age of 35, and even then few survive the ensuing bureaucratic gauntlet. It is common for couples who have gotten far enough to have taken a child home to actually return it to the orphanage because they were unable to complete the final stages of the process. This has created a huge and growing market for privately arranged adoptions in areas where abandoning infants is common. Prior to 1990 these may have numbered over 500,000 annually and evidence suggests that they have since increased in frequency, with girls accounting for nearly all of the growth. Private adoptions like these are almost always arranged in secret—“under-the-table”. Penalties can be harsh for adopting as well as birth families. Infants adopted outside of approved channels, or chaobao, are considered to be aiding and abetting an over-quota birth, and are therefore assumed prima-facie to be over-quota. Families commonly report over-quota firths to local Civil Affairs cadres as having been stillborn or miscarried, and adopting families carefully avoid any official evidence of their existence. The end result has been an entire generation of girls who are invisible to census data and household registration records, which are known to be growing more unreliable with each passing year. It’s possible that some girls are still being adopted as servants, or as tongyangxi (betrothals raised from birth to be spouses for a son). Historically, the practice of taking tongyangxi was a socially accepted form of adoption that provided many benefits in Chinese villages. By raising a wife for their son from birth a family could insure her loyalty and avoid unmanageably high marriage costs (particularly bride price). Many childless couples also believed that taking a tongyangxi would “lead in” (or, increase their chances for) the birth of a son. China has criminalized both practices and they have become extremely rare, but it’s unlikely they’ve died out completely in rural areas. What we do know is that tens of thousands and perhaps even 100,000 or more Chinese girls have been abandoned since the early 90’s. Some of these girls have perished. Many more are in orphanages hidden behind a dark curtain of national shame—unnoticed and unwanted.

Soon Audrey and I would be traveling to the other side of the world to bring one of these girls home.

Departure